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Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation in the Age of Online Speech:
The Relevance of Anti-SLAPP and Anti-CyberSLAPP Legislation
I.

INTRODUCTION

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPs”) are not a new phenomenon in
American jurisprudence, yet these lawsuits have been the topic of recent commentary. The discussion
surrounding SLAPPs may be a result of various states proposing new or amended anti-SLAPP laws—
Virginia and New York, for instance, are a few of the latest legislatures to propose amended anti-SLAPP
legislation.1 Or maybe, the rise of online speech and journalism have created new questions and concerns
relating to SLAPPs. The point is, while strategic lawsuits against public participation are in no way new,
they are as relevant now as ever.
Most individuals with social media presences have likely either expressed or witnessed the
expression of opinions online. The internet has given rise to whole new platforms on which public
participation can exist. For example, online review forums are becoming increasingly popular with sites
such as Yelp, TripAdvisor, Google Reviews, and Glassdoor providing users with platforms to offer
opinions about tourism spots, restaurants, and workplaces. Even e-commerce sites like Amazon allow
users to leave reviews about the products they buy. When considering these and the countless other
examples of online channels for speech and public participation, the subject of SLAPP litigation appears
especially relevant to matters relating to computer and internet law.
This article aims to provide an overview of SLAPPs and the recently coined “cyberSLAPPs;”
some of the resulting legislation in response to these lawsuits; and a discussion about the relevance of
SLAPPs in relation to online speech and participation. Further, this article attempts to provoke thought
and continue the discussion about the relevance of anti-SLAPP legislation as electronic forums become
more commonplace and public participation becomes increasingly accessible online. The article is

1

Brad Kutner, Anti-SLAPP Speech Protections Pushed in Virginia Legislature, Courthouse News Service (Feb. 3,
2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/anti-slapp-speech-protections-pushed-in-virginia-legislature/; New York
Legislature Passes Revised Anti-SLAPP Law to Deter Frivolous Lawsuits and Strengthen Free Speech Protections,
Gibson Dunn (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-york-legislature-passes-revised-anti-slapp-law-todeter-frivolous-lawsuits-and-strengthen-free-speech-protections/.
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organized into four subsequent sections, the first which offers a summary of some of the general
principles of SLAPPs and cyberSLAPPs. The article then examines current and proposed state legislation
attempting to protect citizens against SLAPP and SLAPP-like litigation. Next, the article considers
federal issues related to SLAPP litigation and legislation. The section includes discussion about federal
anti-SLAPP legislation, some of the arguments for and against a federal anti-SLAPP law, and some of the
jurisdictional questions that commonly arise when SLAPPs end up in the federal courts. Finally, the
article concludes with a discussion on the relevance of SLAPPs and resulting legislation in the age of
online communication and anonymous commentary.
II.

SLAPP AND CYBERSLAPP ACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

Examining how SLAPPs and anti-SLAPP legislation are relevant in the digital age first requires
an understanding of what constitutes a SLAPP. Essentially, strategic lawsuits against public participation
are lawsuits that attempt to chill public participation by intimidating defendants with legal action.2 While
SLAPPs are often associated with artificial defamation or libel claims, not all SLAPPs are related to
speech. The Digital Media Law Project lists defamation as well as interference with contract or economic
advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claims, and conspiracy as four common claims
that a SLAPP may bring.3 Plaintiffs might bring SLAPPs in attempt to win a settlement or succeed in
court, but that is not always the primary goal. Rather, plaintiffs commonly use SLAPPs as intimidation
tactics to deter defendants from speaking or participating in a way that is unfavorable to plaintiffs.4 The
First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the rights of assembly, religious exercise,
speech, press, and petition.5 Anti-SLAPP statutes are often enacted to prevent threats to First Amendment
protections.6

2

Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), Digital Media Law Project,
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/responding-strategic-lawsuits-against-public-participation-slapps (last visited Feb.
15, 2020).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
U.S. Const. amend. I.
6
Understanding Anti-SLAPP Laws, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
https://www.rcfp.org/resources/anti-slapp-laws/.
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The term “cyberSLAPP” is sometimes used to refer to SLAPPs that infringe on individuals’ First
Amendment rights on the internet.7 SLAPPs arising from blog posts and online comments are among the
examples of cyberSLAPPs that the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Ohio offers on its
website.8 The ACLU of Ohio explains that oftentimes, cyberSLAPPs not only seek to intimidate online
speakers, but also to uncover the speaker behind anonymous internet speech.9 These concerns raise
questions about the right to speak anonymously on the internet, First Amendment protections to online
speech, and whether protections similar to reporters privileges may apply to ordinary internet
commentary.
There is currently no federal anti-SLAPP law, and consequently, no federal anti-cyberSLAPP
statute.10 However, some case law exists regarding whether states’ anti-SLAPP legislation also protects
against cyberSLAPPs. For example, in 2001, the California District Court for the Central District of
California found that the state’s anti-SLAPP statute is applicable to SLAPPs arising from online
commentary in the case, Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe, 1.11
In Global Telemedia, the defendants were SLAPPed by a media company for posting unfavorable
commentary about the company on an online bulletin board.12 The plaintiff brought a case “for trade libel,
libel per se, interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage against several
posters . . . .”13 The defendants responded to the suit by filing motions to strike under the state’s antiSLAPP statute which this article discusses in further detail in Section III.14 In order to succeed under the

7

What is a CyberSLAPP?, ACLU Ohio, https://www.acluohio.org/slapped/what-is-a-cyber-slapp.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), supra note 2.
8

11

Do Anti-SLAPP Laws Apply to Online Libel Suits?, Freedom Forum Institute,
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/about/faq/do-anti-slapp-laws-apply-to-online-libel-suits/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2020) (citing Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
12
Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261 at 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
13
Id. at 1264.
14
Id.
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California statute, a court must find that (1) the defendants were exercising their First Amendment rights
by commenting on a public issue, and (2) the defendants were likely to succeed in court.15
The court determined that the defendants’ posts were a valid exercise of free speech and that the
subject matter of the posts was a matter of a public concern.16 In its discussion of public concern, the
court acknowledged the plaintiff’s status as a publicly traded company with several thousand investors.17
Further, the court noted that the defendants’ posts about the plaintiff were among 30,000 other postings in
chat rooms about Global Telemedia on the online bulletin board.18 Additionally, the defendants were not
competitors of Global Telemedia and were rather engaging in speech as investors.19 The court ultimately
found that the defendants “established a prima facie case that the basis of the claims against [the
defendants] arose out of acts in furtherance of [their] right to free speech in connection with a public
issue,” and thus, the plaintiff had a shifted burden to prove a probability of success.20 The court
determined that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success in its case against the defendants.21 The
court also found that the defendants’ statements seemed to be opinions, which, unlike facts, are not
actionable in trade libel and defamation claims.22 Further, even if the statements were factual, the court
said that the plaintiff failed to show damages, and therefore did not prove a likelihood of success in the
trade libel or defamation claims.23
Global Telemedia embodies many elements that are common in SLAPP litigation: public
participation (in this case, speech on an online forum), unfavorable publicity to a plaintiff, and economic
disproportion amongst the parties (here, a publicly traded company and individual private citizens). The

15

Id. at 1263, 1265.
Id. at 1266.
17
Id. at 1265.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1266.
20
Id. (citing Globetrotter Software Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp 2d 1127, 1129 (N.D. Cal, 1999)).
21
Id. at 1270-71
22
Id. at 1267-60.
23
Id. at 1270-71.
16
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case also exemplifies a court that determined a state’s anti-SLAPP law was applicable to a case involving
a cyberSLAPP.
III.

STATE LEGISLATION

More than half of the U.S. states and territories currently have anti-SLAPP statutes that provide
various levels of protections and safeguards to defendants.24 The Media Law Resource Center (“MLRC”)
is a nonprofit membership organization made up of media providers and legal professionals who serve
media providers.25 The MLRC has multiple publications, hosts conferences, provides resources relating to
media law, and is involved in advocacy relating to various communications law issues.26 The MLRC
explains that anti-SLAPP legislation attempts to provide efficient and inexpensive defenses to individuals
facing SLAPPs.27 Many anti-SLAPP statutes allow defendants facing SLAPP litigation to seek early
dismissal and sometimes obtain legal fees.28
Andrew Dennington is a partner at Cohn Kavanaugh in Boston, where his practice areas include
business litigation, employment, and defense law.29 As a member of the DRI Commercial Litigation
Committee, he wrote a 2017 article in the organization’s publication, For the Defense, entitled “Do AntiSLAPP Statutes Protect Bloggers?”30 In his article, Dennington explains that while anti-SLAPP statutes
are distinct to the state where they exist, such laws give defendants a “procedural mechanism” allowing
for early dismissals of SLAPPs.31 Dennington identifies the two prongs that courts examine when a
defendant asserts a lawsuit violates an anti-SLAPP statute: (1) “whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from

24

Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, Media Law Resource Center,
https://www.medialaw.org/component/k2/item/3494 (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
25
About MLRC, Media Law Resource Center, https://www.medialaw.org/about-mlrc (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
26
Id.
27
Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 24.
28
Id.
29
Andrew R. Dennington – Biography, Cohn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford, LLP,
https://www.connkavanaugh.com/andrew-r-dennington (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).
30
Andrew R. Dennington, Do Anti-SLAPP Statutes Protect Bloggers?, DRI For the Defense, 36 (July 2017),
https://www.connkavanaugh.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Do-Anti-SLAPP-Statutes-Protect-Bloggers.pdf.
31
Id. at 37.
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protected activity,” and (2) “whether the plaintiff’s claim nonetheless is sufficiently meritorious to
proceed, notwithstanding that it arises from protected activity.”32
It is important to note that even if a state does not have an anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant facing
a SLAPP can still win their case.33 For instance, if the Global Telemedia case occurred in a state with a
narrower or even nonexistent anti-SLAPP statute than that of California, the defendants still may have
prevailed at trial using other procedural mechanisms meant to combat baseless claims. However, the
burden of costly and inconvenient litigation may be enough to chill speech or discourage public
participation.34 Even if a defendant knows a claim against them is meritless under the First Amendment,
they still probably want to avoid time-consuming and costly litigation – the fear of being served a lawsuit
alone may be enough to discourage a person from exercising their right to public participation. There are
also judicial efficiency concerns that are associated with anti-SLAPP legislation.35 In 2009, the U.S.
House of Representatives introduced the Citizen Participation Act of 2009, which this article discusses in
further detail in Section IV.36 The Summary of the Act states:
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), filed against thousands of
individuals, organizations, and businesses based upon their valid exercise of the rights to
petition or free speech, are an abuse of the judicial process that waste judicial resources
and clog the already overburdened court dockets.37
As judicial efficiency continues to be a policy concern in the passage of legislation, the concern
that SLAPPs manipulate the resources of the courts seems to provide a convincing argument for enacting
anti-SLAPP laws.
While a majority of the states have anti-SLAPP laws to combat the negative impacts of the
meritless lawsuits, the levels of protection afforded to defendants vary greatly by territory.38 In an effort

32

Id.
Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), supra note 2.
34
Id.
35
Citizen Participation Act of 2009, Summary, H.R. 4364, 111th Congress, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111thcongress/house-bill/4364.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 24.
33
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to demonstrate how different states’ anti-SLAPP laws vary, this article will look at four different statutes
offering varying degrees of protection. California, for instance, has a notoriously broad anti-SLAPP
statute that protects defendants facing SLAPPs arising out of participation or speech about public issues.39
New York’s anti-SLAPP laws, in contrast, are much narrower.40 Further, Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute
is an example of an anti-SLAPP law that was deemed unconstitutional.41 It is one of only two state antiSLAPP laws that have been struck down for unconstitutionality.42 Finally, while Virginia currently has
an anti-SLAPP law, the commonwealth is one of the latest jurisdictions to propose amended anti-SLAPP
legislation.43 The article will explain the current provisions of the Virginia’s anti-SLAPP statute and
consider some of the factors that may have inspired proposals for changes.
a. California: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §425.16
California’s anti-SLAPP law, found at Section 425.16 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
is a broad statute that provides substantial rights and remedies to defendants who have been SLAPPed.44
Section 425 is entitled: “Legislative findings; Special motion to strike action arising from ‘act in
furtherance of person’s right to petition or free speech under United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue.’”45 In Section 425.16(a), the statute explains the legislature’s policy
reasons for enacting the statute and construing the law broadly. It states:
The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and petition of the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it
is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial
process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.46

39

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
N.Y. Civ. Rights §§ 70-a, 76-a; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3111, 3112.
41
Minn. Stat. § 554.02; Leiendecker v. Asian Woman United of Minn., 895 N.W. 2d 623, 637-38 (S.C. Minn., 2017).
42
Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 24.
43
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-223.2; Kutner, supra note 1.
44
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
45
Id.
46
Id. at § 435.16(a).
40
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In Global Telemedia, the court’s decision primarily focused on whether the elements of a SLAPP
under California’s anti-SLAPP statute existed.47 While there is some discussion of the public nature of
online internet boards, the electronic medium on which the defendants exercised their free speech rights
was not the main focus of the opinion.48 Further, the court was able to use the online medium on which
the speech occurred in its analysis, specifically in its determination of whether the defendants’ speech
dealt with a public issue. Because the message board that the defendants used included over 30,000
postings about the plaintiff’s company, the court saw this as further indication that the matter on which
the defendants spoke was one of public concern.49
California’s anti-SLAPP statute protects four broad categories of public participation:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative executive, or judicial,
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.50
Section (e) of the California statute provides a wide array of categories in which speech or public
participation can occur.51 The defendants’ speech in Global Telemedia, for instance, would not likely fall
within the first two categories of the anti-SLAPP statute because the defendants’ speech dealt with
commentary about Global Telemedia, a telecommunications and media company, rather than commentary
about legislative, executive, or judicial matters .52 Nonetheless, the second two categories of speech that
the statute names demonstrates the broad nature of the statute and its applicability to a wide array of
speech.53

47

132 F. Supp. 2d at 1264-65.
Id.
49
Id. at 1265.
50
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).
51
Id.
52
132 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).
53
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).
48
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Many states do not have such broad anti-SLAPP laws. Some anti-SLAPP statutes apply only to
speech and public participation related to legislative, executive, or judicial matters.54 Still, some states
have even narrower statutes. For example, Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP legislation, found in Sections
7707, and 8301-03 of Title 27 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, “apply only to individuals
petitioning the government about environmental issues.”55 Section 8302(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (b), a person that, pursuant to Federal or State law, files
an action in the courts of this Commonwealth to enforce an environmental law or regulation
or that makes an oral or written communication to a government agency relating to
enforcement or implementation of an environmental law or regulation shall be immune
from civil liability in any resulting legal proceeding for damages where the action or
communication is aimed at procuring favorable governmental action.56
In comparison to narrow statutes like that of Pennsylvania, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is
much broader and more comprehensive, making it favorable among defendants facing SLAPP litigation.
Many other states have modeled or amended their SLAPP statutes to resemble that of California.57
b. New York
New York’s anti-SLAPP legislation is made up primarily of four statutes: New York Civil
Rights Law Sections 70-a and 76-a, and New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules 3211 and 3212.58 The
protections that New York affords defendants facing SLAPPs are substantially less broad than antiSLAPP laws of other states like California.59 There have been some attempts in the New York legislature
to broaden current anti-SLAPP laws as attorneys Edward Spiro and Christopher Hardwood acknowledge
in their article, “Significant Liability May Await Those Who File SLAPP Suits.”60 Most recently, in July
2020, the New York State Senate and Assembly passed Senate Bill S52 which has potential to

54

Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 24.
Pennsylvania, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, https://www.rcfp.org/anti-slappguide/pennsylvania/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (citing PA C.S. §§ 7707, 8301-03).
56
27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8302(a).
57
Anti-SLAPP Statutes and Commentary, supra note 24.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Edward M. Spiro and Christopher B. Harwood, Significant Liability May Await Those Who File SLAPP Suits,
Law.com: New York Law Journal (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/10/11/significant-liability-may-await-those-who-file-slappsuits/?slreturn=20200221143829.
55
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dramatically expand the state’s current anti-SLAPP laws.61 Attorney Amy Chambers explains some of the
notable impacts the bill could have in her article, “New York Anti-SLAPP Law No Longer Just a Slap on
the Wrist.”62 The legislation is still pending approval from the state’s governor.63 For purposes of
demonstrating the stark contrasts in anti-SLAPP laws in various states, this article looks specifically at
New York’s current anti-SLAPP protections which remain rather narrow and apply only in limited
circumstances.
i. N.Y. Civ. R. §70-a. Actions involving public petition and participation;
recovery of damages.
New York Civil Rights Law Section 70-a(1)(a) gives parties the potential to recover damages and
attorney fees when “the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued
without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of law.”64 Section 1(b) of the statute permits additional compensatory
damages only when there exists “ . . . an additional demonstration that the action involving public petition
and participation was commenced or continued for the purposes of harassing, intimidating, punishing or
otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition, or association rights . . . .”65 Finally,
the statute allows a party to recover punitive damages only “ . . . upon an additional demonstration that
the action involving public petition and participation was commenced or continued for the sole purpose of
harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition
or association rights.”66 Section (2) of the statute requires specific waiver if a party wishes to waive the
right to bring an action under the statute, and Section (3) ensures protection of a party’s right to recovery
under the common law or other statutes, laws, or rules.67

61

Amy Chambers, New York Anti-SLAPP Law No Longer Just a Slap on the Wrist, Tyson & Mendes LLP (Sept. 1,
2020), https://www.tysonmendes.com/new-york-anti-slapp-law-no-longer-just-a-slap-on-the-wrist/ (referencing
2020 N.Y. Senate Bill No. 52-A/Assembly Bill No. 5991A (July 22, 2020)).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a (1)(a).
65
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a (1)(b).
66
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a (1)(c).
67
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a (2)-(3).
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ii. N.Y. Civ. R. §76-a. Actions involving public petition and participation;
when actual malice to be proven.
New York Civil Rights Law Section 76-a(1) provides definitions to the terms and phrases:
“action involving public petition and participation;” “public applicant or permittee;” “communication;”
and “government body.”68 The statute’s definitions of such terminology suggest the narrow nature of the
state’s anti-SLAPP protections. Section 1 of the statute includes the following provisions:
(a) An “action involving public petition and participation” is an action, claim, cross claim
or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is
materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on,
challenge or oppose such application or permission.69
(b) “Public applicant or permittee” shall mean any person who has applied for or obtained
a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or
permission to act from any government body, or any person with an interest,
connection or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application
or permission.70
(c) “Communication” shall mean any statement, claim, allegation in a proceeding,
decision, protest, writing, argument, contention or other expression.71
(d) “Government body” shall mean any municipality, the state, any other political
subdivision or agency of such, the federal government, any public benefit corporation,
or any authority, board, or commission.72
Subsection 2 of the statute goes on to establish that damage recovery by a plaintiff requires clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant’s communication “ . . . was made with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false, where the truth or falsity of such communication
is material to the cause of action at issue.”73 Finally, like Section 70-a(3), 76-a(3) ensures the right for a
party to pursue other recoveries available by the common law, or other applicable statutes, rules, or
laws.74
The New York Civil Rights Law Section 76-a definition of an “action involving public petition
and participation” is also the applicable definition in New York Civil Rule Section 70-a.75 When applying

68

N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (1)(a)-(d).
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (1)(a).
70
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (1)(b).
71
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (1)(c).
72
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (1)(d).
73
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 76-a (2).
74
N.Y. Civ. Rights §§ 70-a (3), 76-a (3).
75
N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a (1).
69
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the definitions from the above statute, parties have limited circumstances under which they can invoke
New York’s anti-SLAPP laws. For instance, unlike California’s law, which ultimately provides antiSLAPP protection to any defendant speaking on a matter of public interest, New York’s protections are
limited to public seekers of government licenses or permissions.76 This severely limits the situations and
circumstances under which the state’s anti-SLAPP legislation is relevant.
iii. N.Y. C.P.L.R. R. 3211 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. R. 3212
Rules 3211 and 3212 of New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules further address procedural
measures concerning New York Civil Rights Law Section 76-a.77 Rule 3211(g) deals specifically with
motions to dismiss in cases regarding public petition and participation.78 Pursuant to Rule 3211(g),
motions to dismiss actions under New York Civil Rights Law Section 76-a “shall be granted unless the
party responding to the motion demonstrates that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law or is
supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law . . . .”79
Rule 3212(h) pertains to summary judgement and places almost the same stipulations on motions for
summary judgment as Rule 3211(g) places on motions for dismissal.80 Both rules seem to place the
burden on SLAPPed defendants when a plaintiff seeks dismissal or summary judgment in response to a
Section 76-a motion.
If New York’s governor signs the state legislature’s currently pending anti-SLAPP bill, antiSLAPP protections stand to expand greatly in New York, and the landscape of SLAPP litigation in the
state could see substantial changes.81 Until then, New York’s anti-SLAPP laws remain relatively narrow.

76

N.Y. Civ. Rights § 70-a; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h).
78
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g).
79
Id.
80
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3212(h).
81
Chambers, supra note 61.
77
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c. Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01-554.06
Chapter 554 of the Minnesota Statutes includes seven sections that make up the state’s antiSLAPP legislation.82 Until 2017, Section 554.02 served as the state’s anti-SLAPP law when the
Minnesota Supreme Court deemed portions of law unconstitutional.83 Under Subdivision 1 of Section
554.02, the section “applies to any motion in a judicial proceeding to dispose of a judicial claim on the
grounds that the claim materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public
participation.”84 Subdivision 2 of the section, which includes the portions that were deemed
unconstitutional, concerns procedure.85 It includes the following provisions:
(1) discovery must be suspended pending the final disposition of the motion, including
any appeal; provided that the court may, on motion and after a hearing and for good
cause shown, order that specified and limited discovery be conducted;86
(2) the responding party has the burden of proof, of going forward with the evidence, and
of persuasion on the motion;87
(3) the court shall front the motion and dismiss the judicial claim unless the court finds
that the responding party has produced clear and convincing evidence that the acts of
the moving party are not immunized from liability under section 554.03;88 and
(4) any governmental body to which the moving party’s acts were directed or the attorney
general’s office may intervene in, defend, or otherwise support the moving party.89
Under the statute, plaintiffs responding to a defendant’s invocation of the state’s anti-SLAPP laws had the
burden of proof and persuasion.90 The law also set a clear and convincing evidence standard.91 Further,
the statute allowed for a court rather than a jury to determine whether dismissal is proper.92 The language
of the statute seemed favorable to defendants in SLAPPs. However, as the Minnesota Supreme Court
determined in 2017, the anti-SLAPP law was unconstitutional.93
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The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Clauses 2 and 3 of Subdivision 2 of Section
554.02 were unconstitutional in the case, Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota.94 In
Leiendecker, the court determined that Clauses 2 and 3 of §554.02 Subdivision 2 violated the right the a
jury trial because (1) they shift the fact-finding duty of a jury to district courts, and (2) they place a clear
and convincing evidence burden of proof rather than the lower burden of a preponderance of evidence on
the responding party before trial.95 The opinion continued by determining that the unconstitutional clauses
of the statute were inseverable from the remaining provisions.96 The court determined that “[w]ithout the
unconstitutional provisions, section 554.02 provides no procedure for courts to determine whether a
lawsuit violates the substantive prohibition of Minn. Stat. §554.03,” and therefore the entirety of Section
554.02 “is unconstitutional when it requires a district court to make a pretrial finding that speech or
conduct is not tortious under Minn. Stat. §554.03 . . . . ” 97 The case resulted in a 6-1 decision with a
dissenting opinion from the court’s Chief Justice.98 Chief Justice Gildea took the position that it was
unnecessary for the court to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, and that evaluation of the statute
was contrary to precedent that the court should “resolve cases without reaching constitutional issues
whenever possible.”99 Chief Justice Gildea went on to say that it was “not necessary to decide whether
section 554.02 violates the jury-trial right because the dispositive question that the district court decided
was not one of law.” 100
A news article in the Saint Paul Legal Ledger responded to the case days after the decision.101
The article, written by Mike Mosedale, explained that many attorneys did not find the statute effective in
the first place.102 Both Mosedale’s article, and an article by Marshall H. Tanick in MinnPost
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acknowledged the varying opinions surrounding the Leiendecker decision.103 Tanick said that despite the
potential impacts of the decision, the ruling was not especially surprising, and further explained that:
A number of lower courts, including the trial judge and intermediate appellate tribunals in
[Leiendecker], had reached the same conclusion. Other jurists in different cases around
the state also had held that the law was unconstitutional for similar or additional reasons,
but the Leiendecker case was the first to yield that result from the state’s highest court.104
Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law is an example of anti-SLAPP legislation that may have been so
broad that it lacked effectiveness. Even before the Minnesota Supreme Court deemed the law
unconstitutional, commentary from practitioners suggests that the law was difficult to apply.105 The
court’s finding the statute unconstitutional demonstrates the sentiment that while an anti-SLAPP statute
may be favorable to a party, that does not mean that the statute should favor a certain party.
d. Virginia: VA. Code Ann. §8.01-223.2
Virginia has had an anti-SLAPP statute since 2007. However, amidst recent high-profile SLAPP
litigation in the commonwealth, there has been a call to add provisions to the current legislation to
provide defendants with additional procedural mechanisms. The current anti-SLAPP statute states:
A person shall be immune from civil liability for a violation of Section 18.2-499, a claim
of tortious interference with an existing contract or business or contractual expectancy, or
a claim of defamation based solely on statements (i) regarding matters of public concern
that would be protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution made
by that person that are communicated to a third party or (ii) made at a public hearing before
the governing body of any locality or other political subdivision, or the boards,
commissions, agencies and authorities thereof, and other governing bodies of any local
governmental entity concerning matters properly before such body . . . . 106
Like many other anti-SLAPP laws, Virginia’s statute does not protect defendants who make knowingly
false statements or who make statements with reckless disregard to whether the statements are true.107
Along with the immunity that Section (A) provides defendants, Section (B) states that defendants may
also be entitled to attorney fees if their case is dismissed under the statute.108 The current law often
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receives criticism for providing weak protections to SLAPPed defendants.109 A Washington Post article
by Justin Jouvenal explains some of the critiques to the current statute are in response to the lack of a
special motion provision and lack of a guarantee of attorney fees.110 Jouvenal reports that “[t]he practical
effect, experts say, is that cases can drag on until the sides begin to exchange evidence and a case goes to
trial. That can mean months—or even years—of wrangling and hefty legal bills.” 111
As of February 2020, Virginia’s House and Senate passed two different bills that would amend
the commonwealth’s current anti-SLAPP laws.112 Melissa Wasser, a Policy Analyst for the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, explains the differences between House Bill 579 and Senate Bill
375 in her article “Virginia legislators pass bills aimed at dismissing frivolous lawsuits restricting First
Amendment Rights.”113 Essentially, both bills would create a kind of special motion for defendants to use
in cases in which they believe they have been SLAPPed.114 Both bills seem to favor the sort of
“procedural mechanism” that are common in anti-SLAPP laws.115 The House’s bill would require
mandatory attorney fee awards, while the Senate’s bill does not allow mandatory but permissive attorney
fees.116
The proposals for a new anti-SLAPP law follow a series of high-profile lawsuits in Virginia
courts, specifically, Depp v. Heard and multiple lawsuits from California Representative Devin Nunes,
including Nunes v. Twitter.117 The lawsuits involve public figures–actor Johnny Depp, and Representative
Nunes, respectively–and have received media attention.118 The suits have exposed some of the
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shortcomings in Virginia’s current anti-SLAPP law and created further discussion about the relevance of
anti-SLAPP laws.119 Additionally, the lawsuits have highlighted continued concerns about SLAPPs and
forum shopping.120
IV.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION

As more states consider passing anti-SLAPP legislation, discussion exists about whether the
legislature should enact a federal anti-SLAPP statute. Three recent pieces of proposed legislation
attempted to provide federal laws to help defendants who have been SLAPPed: The Citizen Participation
Act of 2009, the Free Press Act of 2012, and most recently, the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015.121 While a
federal anti-SLAPP law did not result from the proposed acts, and no federal anti-SLAPP law currently
exists, proposals like the aforementioned continue the discussion about the policy concerns surrounding
SLAPPs.122 Further, as there is no federal anti-SLAPP law, jurisdictional questions persist about whether
defendants can rely on their state’s anti-SLAPP legislation in Federal Court.123
a. Citizen Participation Act
One concern that the Citizen Participation Act of 2009 (H.R. 4364) sought to address was the
impacts that SLAPPs have on the judiciary.124 The bill, proposed to the House of Representatives in 2009,
had three Democratic Representative cosponsors: Charles Gonzalez of Texas, Fortney Pete Stark of
California, and Michael Doyle of Pennsylvania.125 The proposed Act recognizes multiple policy concerns
associated with SLAPPs including: the costliness to defendants; the ability of SLAPPs to chill speech and
public participation; abuses of judicial resources and the burden on the judiciary that SLAPPs stand to
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pose; and the lack of uniform and comprehensive anti-SLAPP laws among the states.126 The bill places
the burden of proof on plaintiffs to show that defendants had “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of falsity by clear and convincing evidence.”127
b. Free Press Act of 2012
In 2012, Senator Jon Kyl proposed a narrower bill to the U.S. Senate, the Free Press Act.128 While
the Citizen Participation Act was more tailored towards protecting individuals who face SLAPPs after
engaging in a wide variety of public participation, the proposed Free Press Act focused on providing
safeguards for media professionals. As the Summary of the bill explains, the legislation attempted to:
authorize a representative of the news media to file a special motion to dismiss any claim
asserted against such representative in a civil action if the claim arises from an oral or
written statement or other expression that is on a matter of public concern or that relates to
a public official or figure . . .129
As is common with proposed legislation, the Free Press Act was the subject of frequent
commentary and critique. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”), for example, was encouraged by
the proposal of federal anti-SLAPP legislation, but expressed critiques to the bill when it was first
proposed.130 The Electronic Frontier Foundation was founded in 1990 as a nonprofit focused on issues
relating to civil liberties online.131 The organization is vocal about digital topics pertaining to creativity
and innovation, free speech, international subjects, privacy, security, and transparency.132 EFF
correspondent, Trevor Timm, criticized the Act for being too narrow in a 2012 article entitled “New
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Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation Introduced: A Good Start.”133 Timm expressed the concern that the law
might not protect “bloggers, citizens journalists or other commentators on the Internet . . . ”.134
Eric Goldman also critiqued the Free Press Act of 2012 in a Forbes article entitled, “We Need
Federal Anti-SLAPP Legislation, But Sen. Kyl’s ‘Free Press Act of 2012’ Isn’t the Answer (Yet).”135
Goldman, a professor of Law at the Santa Clara University School of Law, echoed the common criticism
that the bill was too narrow.136 He had three overarching critiques in arguing that the Free Press Act, as
proposed, was not broad enough. He first took the stance that the act was “anachronistic” because the act,
as proposed, would only apply to journalists in a society where so many non-journalists post content on
the internet.137 Next, Goldman argued that the proposal was “ambiguous.”138 He cites phrasing like
“news” and “information of potential interest to a segment of the public” as leaving room for questions
when interpreting the bill.139 Finally, Goldman’s article suggested that the proposed legislation was
“regressive” because it would not afford as much protection to individual consumers as it would
institutional defendants.140 Goldman takes the position that the proposed language of the bill “favors
defendants who are more likely to be able to afford litigation even without anti-SLAPP protection, while
leaving the individuals with the least financial capacity without the extra statutory protection.”141
Goldman has voiced his support for a national anti-SLAPP legislation, and his article suggested two
benefits that would come from an adoption of a federal law: (1) “it would immediately provide antiSLAPP protection to the tens of millions of Americans who lack such protection today,” and (2), “it could
establish a national ‘floor’ to strengthen anti-SLAPP protection in those states with narrower anti-SLAPP
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laws.”142 His article, while critical of the Free Press Act as proposed, suggested that the act was a step in
the right direction of eventually adopting federal anti-SLAPP legislation.143
While no new federal law resulted from the proposal of the Free Press Act of 2012 after the bill
was referred to the Committee of the Judiciary, there is value in considering some of the critiques to the
proposed legislation.144 A common criticism, as both Timms and Goldman’s articles raise, is the bill
being too narrow. The next federal anti-SLAPP proposal, the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, embodied much
broader protections.
c. SPEAK FREE Act of 2015
In 2015, Congress saw yet another proposed bill to combat SLAPP litigation – the SPEAK FREE
Act of 2015 (H.R. 2304). The Act, sponsored by Representative Blake Farenthold of Texas received
bipartisan support and was co-sponsored by thirty-two Representatives, twenty from the
Democratic Party, and twelve from the Republican Party.145 The proposed legislation sought to:
allow a person against whom a lawsuit is asserted to file a special motion to dismiss claims
referred to as strategic lawsuits against public participation (“SLAPP suits”) that arise from
an oral or written statement or other expression, or conduct in furtherance of such
expression, by the defendant in connection with an official proceeding or about a matter of
public concern.146
In defining “a matter of public concern,” the bill provided five categories of issues: “(1) health or safety;
(2) environmental, economic, or community well-being; (3) the government; (4) a public official or public
figure; or (5) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.”147 This language suggests broader
protections than the Free Press Act of 2012, as well as many individual states’ already existing statutes.
Similar to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015 proposed protection to a
variety of different forms of participation relating to various issues of “public concern.”
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The SPEAK FREE Act was referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil
Justice in June of 2015, but no further action resulted.148 Nonetheless, the proposal continued to
spark conversation about federal anti-SLAPP legislation and garnered support from organizations
like the Public Participation Project.149 The Public Participation Project is an organization that
focuses its efforts primarily on anti-SLAPP legislation at both the state and federal level.150 The
Public Participation Project supported the proposal of the SPEAK FREE Act and has attempted to
help get the act reintroduced in the House and introduced in the Senate.151 Upon introduction of
the bill in 2015, the Public Participation Project issued a press release supporting the Act. The
press release highlights the bipartisan nature of the bill and points out that the SPEAK FREE Act
is the first proposed federal anti-SLAPP statute that had co-sponsors from both the Democratic
and Republican parties.152 The press release suggests that a federal anti-SLAPP law is necessary
as public participation on the internet continues to grow.153
d. SLAPP Litigation in Federal Court
Without a comprehensive federal anti-SLAPP law, litigants will sometimes attempt to invoke a
state’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court. Federal courts are split on whether anti-SLAPP laws create
procedural or substantive measures, and thus, whether such state statutes are applicable in federal court.154
Litigator Ashley J. Heilprin explores this issue in a 2019 American Bar Association article.155 Heilprin
reminds readers that the Eire Doctrine requires federal courts sitting in diversity to use the substantive law
of the state in which the court is located, but the federal procedural rules over state procedural laws.156
Disagreement as to whether a state’s anti-SLAPP law is procedural or substantive often exists in federal
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court cases. In fact, as Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson reported in an October 2020 Bloomberg Law
article, litigants in Retzlaff v. Van Dyke recently petitioned the Supreme Court to address the split among
the circuits regarding the procedural of substantive nature of state anti-SLAPP laws.157
As Heilprin’s article explains, the Fifth Circuit determined that Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, the
Texas Citizens Participation Act, is procedural rather than substantive.158 This determination, which
resulted from the 2019 case, Klocke v. Watson, means that the Texas statute is not applicable in federal
courts sitting in diversity.159 Heilprin further notes that while federal courts like the Fifth and D.C.
Circuits have determined state anti-SLAPP laws to be procedural and thus inapplicable in federal
litigation, other Circuits have found some state anti-SLAPP laws to be suitable in federal court.160 For
instance, the First Circuit ruled that Maine’s anti-SLAPP law is appropriate in federal court in the 2010
case, Godin v. Schencks.161 Further, while the Fifth Circuit determined that Texas’s anti-SLAPP law does
not apply in federal court, it has not ruled that all anti-SLAPP laws are inapplicable.162 For example, in
2009 the court found Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law could apply in federal court in Henry v. Lake Charles
American Press, LLC.163 It is unclear whether Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law still applies in the Fifth Circuit
after Klocke, and further questions exist as to whether Texas could amend its current anti-SLAPP statute
to be sufficient for use in federal court.164 These cases demonstrate the uncertainties that often arise when
litigants want to use a state’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court. Further, such uncertainties suggest another
argument for why a federal anti-SLAPP law could be beneficial.
Heilprin’s article also discusses the common concern about potential forum shopping resulting
when state anti-SLAPP laws are inapplicable in federal court.165 If plaintiffs become more inclined to
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SLAPP defendants in federal court rather than state court, defendants may be forced to endure litigation
even when a state anti-SLAPP law could otherwise apply.166 That not only seems counterproductive to
judicial efficiency, but suggests opportunities for parties who bring SLAPPs to take advantage of the
federal court system.
V.

RELEVANCE TO ONLINE SPEECH AND JOURNALISM

Exercising one’s First Amendment rights to free speech and participation is arguably easier than
ever with the rise of the internet and online forums. The internet has undoubtedly impacted the
accessibility and ability for private individuals to exercise their First Amendment rights of speech and
participation. As the Public Participation Project noted, “[t]echnology now makes it possible for everyone
to don the hat of journalist, editor, town crier or anonymous pamphleteer.”167 While this change in the
public participation landscape raises the possibility of increased participation, it also presents new legal
challenges and questions. Further, the increase in speech and participation means that more individuals
may find themselves vulnerable to SLAPP suits. As such, strategic lawsuits against public participation
are relevant to internet law.
The internet not only makes speech and public participation more accessible; it also allows
speakers to reach wider audiences. Many individuals, like Professor Goldman, have taken the position
that the internet’s new forums for commentary present potential societal benefits. In the Public
Participation Project’s Speak Free Act of 2015 press release, Goldman said:
Society benefits when consumers share their critical consumer reviews and social media
complaints, but those negative comments often trigger strongly-worded legal threats. AntiSLAPP laws tell consumers that they can ignore bullying tactics, which helps keep this
socially important content from being scrubbed from the Internet.168
The internet provides a powerful tool, which, if used properly and responsibly, presents new
opportunities for societal gain. Of course, the internet also presents new opportunities for speech to be
used negatively. While this article does not attempt to unpack the intricacies of online speech laws, it is
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worth acknowledging that just like in-person speech, not all online speech is valuable.169 The purpose of
anti-SLAPP laws is not to discount valid causes of action including meritorious libel and defamation
claims.170 Rather, anti-SLAPP laws should attempt to ensure the integrity of authentic causes of action
while protecting individuals from baseless claims.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The right to public participation has long been a cornerstone of American democracy, and
continuous developments to the internet provide brand new ways in which individuals can exercise their
First Amendment rights. As public participation and exercising speech becomes easier than ever, there are
new opportunities for litigants to bring meritless SLAPP claims against defendants.
While many states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws to help protect against and discourage SLAPPs,
the levels of protection that anti-SLAPP laws provide vary greatly by state.171 Some states, like
California, offer broad protections for SLAPPed defendants.172 Other states, like Pennsylvania and New
York, have narrower statutes that apply to SLAPPs resulting only from certain forms of participation.173
An anti-SLAPP statute like that of Minnesota may have aggressive provisions that go so far as to lose
effectiveness, or even be determined unconstitutional.174 Other states, like Virginia, may be trying to
actively amend existing anti-SLAPP laws.175 Finally, some states lack any anti-SLAPP legislation at
all.176 The lack of a comprehensive federal anti-SLAPP statute presents multiple questions and concerns.
For instance, federal courts are split in regard to the applicability of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal
courts.177 While there has been a call for a federal anti-SLAPP statute as well as multiple attempts to pass
such legislation in recent years, a federal anti-SLAPP law has not yet resulted.178
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A well-construed federal anti-SLAPP law is arguably a necessary safeguard, especially as
journalism, speech, and participation, continue to grow on online platforms. The fact that some states
have anti-SLAPP laws while others provide no safeguards to defendants who are SLAPPed seems
outdated in the age of the internet. The internet already poses new jurisdictional questions.179 Without a
uniform anti-SLAPP law at the federal level, additional questions about the applicability of one state’s
anti-SLAPP law over another are likely to arise, especially in cases involving cyberSLAPPs and online
speech.
In the event that the federal legislature passes an anti-SLAPP law, there may be reason to make it
comprehensive enough so to apply to cyberSLAPPs like the California statute.180 However, the language
of a federal anti-SLAPP law should not be so broad that becomes ineffective or contradicts judicial
principles like the Minnesota law.181 A federal anti-SLAPP law should necessarily strike a balance in its
language and provide comprehensive protection.
To echo Professor Goldman, a federal anti-SLAPP law stands to provide safeguards to numerous
individuals who lack ample protection against SLAPPs, and to establish the minimum requirements for
state anti-SLAPP laws, thus ensuring stronger protection from narrower statutes that already exist.182 I
think there is a lot to be said about the bi-partisan nature of the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015.183 The fact
that it garnered support from individuals of both major political parties suggests a sense of agreement that
some sort of anti-SLAPP law could be beneficial. Further, I am persuaded by the judicial efficiency
policy concerns that many anti-SLAPP laws seek to address.184
Despite the many questions and concerns that currently exist surrounding the topic of strategic
lawsuits against public participation, I hope this article has posed food for thought about the relevance of
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SLAPPs and the potential impacts that anti-SLAPP laws stand to have on the judiciary, state and federal
legislatures, and democracy.
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